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Islamist Violent Extremism: A New Form of 
Conflict or Business as Usual?
Andrew Glazzard*, Sasha Jesperson†, Thomas Maguire‡ and  
Emily Winterbotham*
Islamist violent extremist (IVE) groups are frequently involved in civil conflicts. 
Indeed, some groups owe their origins to conflict, and tens of thousands of Islamists 
have chosen to participate in conflicts taking place in foreign countries in the past 
35 years. Increasingly, IVE groups appear to have the capacity to influence the 
conflicts they are involved in, and are influenced in turn by their experiences. As a 
result, for those working on conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction, 
the involvement of IVE groups raises questions of whether traditional responses 
remain adequate. Drawing on three country case studies – Nigeria, Kenya and 
Iraq/Syria, this article examines the similarities and differences between IVE groups 
and other conflict actors, and what this means for development, state-building and 
peacebuilding responses.
Responses to conflict, particularly by 
development actors, have become increas-
ingly sophisticated since the post-Cold War 
interventionist phase of the 1990s. A substan-
tial toolkit has been developed with the UK 
Department for International Development 
(DfID), often at the forefront of these 
advances. Over this period however, conflict 
has evolved significantly, with non-state actors 
growing in importance. The most recent evo-
lution is the emergence of Islamist violent 
extremist (IVE) groups. In contrast to other 
conflict actors, their nature and aims appear 
to be qualitatively different. This raises the 
question of whether the tools that have been 
developed in recent decades to prevent and 
resolve conflict are still relevant or if new tools 
need to be developed. This article assesses the 
aims and objectives,  ‘factors’ for involvement, 
social/cultural identity pull factors, organi-
sational structure and demographics, tactics 
and methods of IVE groups in three case 
studies – Kenya, Nigeria and Iraq/Syria. These 
groups are compared to non-Islamist groups 
in the same country to consider just how dif-
ferent they are, and what this means for devel-
opment actors that are responding to conflict.
‘Islamist Violent Extremism’ is a broad 
label that includes a wide range of dispa-
rate groups and movements, ranging from 
Shia revolutionaries to popular militias to 
cell-based terrorist groups such as Al Qaida. 
The motives, targets, demands, structures 
and arenas of operations vary significantly 
amongst different groups and may also 
change over time (Glazzard et al. 2015). The 
article draws on debates in conflict studies, 
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terrorism studies and development  studies 
in order to understand these factors. By 
focusing on three diverse case studies, this 
article engages  with the diversity of IVE.
In Kenya, this article engages with the 
operations and supporters of Harakat 
 al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin (Al Shabaab) and 
affiliated or sympathetic groups like Al 
Hijra, comparing them to two contempo-
rary non-Islamist groups (the armed wing of 
the Mombasa Republic Council (MRC) and 
the Mungiki) as well as a historical group 
(the Mau Mau movement). The Nigeria 
case study compares Boko Haram with the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta (MEND). Boko Haram and MEND are 
both violent movements that originated 
in socially and economically marginalised 
regions of Nigeria, with a similar approach 
despite apparent ideological differences. The 
Iraq/Syria case study focuses on three Sunni 
Islamist groups: Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL), Jabhat Al Nusra (JaN), and Ahrar 
al-Sham (AaS) and compares them with each 
other and with Shia militant groups such as 
the Badr Organisation in Iraq.
By comparing IVE groups with  non-Islamist 
groups in these three case studies, key simi-
larities and differences have emerged in the 
areas of consideration that have implications 
for how development actors respond to con-
flict involving IVE groups. These areas are 
outlined below, followed by a discussion of 
what this means for development actors.
Aims and Objectives
In contrast to conflict studies, much terror-
ism research argues, or assumes, a sharp 
distinction between nationalist groups and 
ideological groups: ideological terrorists seek 
to transform global society rather than estab-
lish a separate homeland. Islamist extremists 
may desire a new Caliphate but do not seem 
to be motivated by any particular nationalist 
or ethnic identity (Fettweis 2009: 270; Piazza 
2009).
Salafi-jihadism is framed in religious 
terms. However, Ranstorp (1998) and Gerges 
(2009) argue that this should be seen as a 
modern movement emerging in the 1990s 
when Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Usama bin 
Ladin articulated the doctrine of the ‘far 
enemy’ – the United States as hidden hand 
behind Arab autocracy and the oppression 
of Muslims. Al Qaida’s worldview is reduced 
to a ‘single narrative’ presenting a long his-
tory of conflicts involving Muslims across the 
world as evidence of the West’s war against 
Islam stemming from its implacable fear 
and hatred. The overarching aim of Al Qaida 
(and now ISIL) and others is therefore pre-
sented as the continuation of a 1,400 year 
struggle (Kepel and Milelli 2008) or a ‘clash 
of civilisations’ (Funck and Said 2004), a 
perception which differs from other con-
flicts. Contemporary violent Islamists have 
extended the semantic scope of jihad beyond 
‘just war theory’ in order to legitimise ter-
rorist violence, revolutionary violence, and 
insurgency, while promoting jihad as Islam’s 
‘sixth pillar’ or ‘forgotten obligation’, and 
hence an individual rather than collective 
duty for Muslims (Brahimi 2010; Van de 
Voorde 2011).
ISIL’s principal aim, the expansion of the 
Caliphate, is therefore presented as a state 
for ‘true’ Muslims and a bulwark against the 
enemy reflecting the eschatological as well 
as the geopolitical significance of the Levant 
(Filiu 2011). Its mission statement – ‘remain-
ing and expanding’ – appears to encapsulate 
this aim, while the character of the state is 
implicit in al-Baghdadi’s division of human-
ity into ‘the camp of the Muslims and the 
mujahidin’ and ‘the camp of the Jews, the 
Crusaders, their allies’ (Weiss and Hassan 
2015: 1).
The stated aims of Boko Haram were also 
initially entrenched in religious ideology. 
Boko Haram was founded as a rejection 
of the social vices of the Nigerian state, as 
‘the best thing for a devout Muslim to do 
was to “migrate” from the morally bankrupt 
society to a secluded place and establish an 
ideal Islamic society devoid of political cor-
ruption and moral deprivation’ (Onuoha 
2010: 2). Since 2011, Al Shabaab’s operations 
in Kenya’s North–East and coast regions have 
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been aimed at forming part of a broader 
jihadist project of ‘liberating’ surrounding 
Muslim lands from non-Muslim ‘occupation’ 
and avenging historical injustices (Botha 
2014; Anderson and McKnight 2015). In 
contrast, religious ideology has not featured 
nearly as prominently in the planning or 
rhetoric of the leaders of the MRC, Mau Mau 
or Mungiki in Kenya, or MEND in Nigeria.
Some argue that religion is by its nature 
irrational, and therefore religiously moti-
vated violence must also be irrational 
(Smilansky 2004). Stern (2003) argues that 
religiously inspired violent groups consist-
ently begin with utopian aspirations, even if 
that is not often where they end. While the 
goal of ‘purifying the world of injustice, cru-
elty, and all that is anti-human’ is not in itself 
irrational, Stern (2003: 281) argues it may be 
motivated or accompanied by a ‘spiritual call-
ing’, which is irrational.
Comparing MEND and Boko Haram in 
Nigeria is a good illustration of this argu-
ment. Although not religious, MEND had a 
firm ideology with well defined and localised 
aims based on a common desire for equal-
ity and social justice. MEND’s violent strat-
egy was consistent with its aims, resulting 
in the loss of a quarter of Nigeria’s daily oil 
exports (Courson 2009). Its political strategy 
was equally consistent, as it began to articu-
late its demands to the Nigerian government 
for resource control, constitutional rights, 
and measures to mitigate social marginalisa-
tion, political repression and environmental 
degradation. The demands of MEND were 
supported by international advocacy on the 
damage caused by the oil industry, so their 
demands were seen by many as justified and 
their tactics as rational – even if there was 
strong disapproval of the latter. In contrast, 
because Boko Haram frames its programme 
in religious and cultural terms, it tends to be 
perceived as irrational, uncompromising, or 
even psychopathic (Comolli 2015).
Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler (2006: 
295–6) challenge these claims emphasising 
that this ignores the importance of beliefs 
and ideology in individual utility calculations, 
‘where individuals believe that the spiritual 
payoffs outweigh the negative consequences 
of strategies in the here and now, high-
cost/risk activism is intelligible as a rational 
choice’. Moving on from this, rather than 
seeing Islamists as grievance-stricken reac-
tionaries, recent research has reconceptual-
ised Islamist extremists as strategic thinkers 
engaged in cost-benefit calculations. Ultra-
violence and religious and cultural framing 
of activities do not necessarily mean irration-
ality. Indeed, in some respects Boko Haram’s 
violence has been successful, enabling it to 
conquer territory with excessive security-
force responses aiding recruitment.
Religiously focused pronouncements may 
therefore be committed objectives, or sim-
ply rational framing devices for recruitment. 
Some literature draws a differentiation 
between jihadists and Islamist revolutionar-
ies and terrorists such as those fighting in 
Afghanistan and Bosnia which followed a 
defensive, territorial programme that was 
predicated on the belief that Muslims were 
under attack or occupation (Hegghammer 
2010, 2010/11). Piazza (2009) helpfully 
disaggregates Islamist terrorists into ‘stra-
tegic groups’ such as Hamas, which despite 
claiming to be motivated by religious aims, 
have similar aims to nationalist-separatist 
groups and ‘abstract/universal’ groups such 
as utopian Al Qaida and its affiliates. A recent 
example is AaS; although cosmic in ideology, 
the group is adopting a ‘Syrian nationalist’ 
programme as evidenced by its signing of a 
‘covenant of honour’ in late 2014 where it 
disavowed any global-jihadist pretensions. 
AaS’ leaders now condemn ISIL and Al Qaida 
for embracing fighters from a diversity of 
traditions, but the group remains part of 
the broader jihadist movement (Weiss and 
Hassan 2015: 162). Even Al Qaida affiliates, 
with the exception of Al Qaida in the Arabian 
Peninsula (AQAP), and now ISIS, do not in 
reality share the same global aims.
In other respects however, participants 
in these conflicts, whether Islamist or not, 
appear to be broadly similar – they are con-
cerned with defending their constituencies, 
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controlling populations, acquiring resources, 
recruiting troops and projecting their power 
militarily and through propaganda. Looking 
closely at ISIS, the group’s real aims – to 
obtain and project power – are more mun-
dane than its ‘cosmic ideology’ might sug-
gest. JaN also aspires to govern territory in 
order to create a safe haven for attacking 
the West (Lister 2015). In contrast to ISIL, 
it does not aspire to govern a full Caliphate 
but a more modest emirate (Turkmani 2015). 
Moreover, at a leadership level, the aims of 
the Shia militias in Syria and Iraq are at least 
partly geopolitical. Both the Sadrist move-
ment and the Islamic Supreme Council of 
Iraq have aggressively asserted Shia identity, 
while many have been responsible for perse-
cuting Sunni Muslim civilians.
The aims of a group can also change with 
time. The aims of Al Shabaab’s leaders and its 
affiliates, while not entirely clear or explicit, 
appear to be influenced by a regional Salafi-
jihadist agenda and part of a broader jihad-
ist project. Indeed, Kenya’s 2011 incursion 
into Somalia, and battlefield successes by the 
African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) 
forces, appear to have played a large part in 
hastening a shift within Al Shabaab’s leader-
ship from a predominantly Somali nationalist 
to a more internationalist jihadist orienta-
tion, which has had significant implications 
in terms of the tactics and operations used 
by the group (Bruton and Williams 2014; 
Bryden 2014; Menkhaus 2014; Hansen 2014; 
Anderson and McKnight 2015). AaS has also 
been shaped by the violence of the Syrian 
battlefield so that it has withdrawn from its 
initial belief in a ‘cosmic’ global-jihadist solu-
tion. In contrast to ISIL, its battlefield juris-
prudence has progressively moderated. That 
it has done so while maintaining its religious 
authenticity, albeit in a more pluralist form 
than other groups, shows that religion can 
be a dynamic force in conflict.
The aims even within a group at a given 
time may not be consistent. While the lead-
ers may have one set of goals, different moti-
vating factors often drive their followers. 
Ideology is important for leaders especially; 
some are ideological entrepreneurs who 
seek to mobilise followers behind a cause. 
Ideology can be a factor for followers, but 
people in conflict situations join violent 
groups for a wide range of reasons – social, 
psychological and practical, as well as politi-
cal. For example, in Nigeria it is unclear how 
many actively support ideals such as an 
Islamic Caliphate propagated by the leaders 
when at the root of the conflict and public 
support for Boko Haram, just as it was with 
MEND, is a response to deprivation and lack 
of access to state services.
‘Factors’ for Involvement
Although religion is important, it is often 
used as a rational framing device for recruit-
ment. Indeed, many followers are driven by 
grievance and may not even understand the 
religious ideology propagated by the leader-
ship. Grievances – individual and group, per-
sonal and vicarious – are important drivers of 
Islamist violence. The United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) 
(2011: 13) includes discrimination, politi-
cal marginalisation, a sense of ‘anger at the 
perceived victimisation of fellow Muslims 
around the globe’, repression of human 
rights, and foreign occupation’ as pertinent 
grievances.
While it is widely supported that there 
is a strong relationship between perceived 
grievances and violent extremism (see 
Allen et al. 2015), debate continues over 
the nature of the relationship, particularly 
whether grievances are the root cause of 
violence or are simply a mechanism to justify 
that violence. For Gupta (2005), grievances 
are a necessary factor1 in violent extremism, 
but they need to be instrumentalised by 
charismatic individuals, labelled as ‘political 
entrepreneurs’, and linked to social and 
psychological factors. Gurr’s (1970) Relative 
Deprivation Theory, however, predicts that 
when there is frustration about the relative 
position of individuals in terms of what they 
have and their perceptions of what they 
ought to have, the likelihood of violence 
increases.
Glazzard et al: Islamist Violent Extremism Art. 13, page 5 of 19
Research in conflict studies increasingly 
points to grievances stemming from fail-
ures of governance as a primary driver of 
violence (Howard 2014). State instability is 
frequently identified as ‘the most consistent 
predictor of country-level terrorist attacks’ 
(Gelfand, LaFree, Fahey et al. 2013; see also 
Piazza, 2007). When the state fails to provide 
human security, there are many examples 
where religion fills the void (Ganiel 2014). In 
situations of conflict and insecurity, popula-
tions are willing to engage with any entity 
that provides stability and security, at least 
in the short term. As a result, many failed or 
failing states have become hubs for extrem-
ist activity.
In Nigeria, while MEND’s narrative was 
explicitly based on grievances and Boko 
Haram has subordinated grievances to reli-
gious and cultural opposition to the state, 
both groups have responded to and seek to 
correct social, political and economic griev-
ances in marginalised regions far removed 
from the centres of power. In fact, Boko 
Haram’s evolution into an ultra-violent ideol-
ogy is also the product of governance failure, 
as the group was radicalised by a combi-
nation of Nigeria’s excessive militarised 
responses and the failure to respond to the 
marginalisation of the northeast (Comolli 
2015).
Flanagan (2008) and Grynkewich (2008) 
find that Islamist and non-Islamist groups 
alike are strengthened by state failures to 
provide basic services including security 
and justice. ISIL has exploited areas with 
weak governance, an active war economy 
and ongoing conflict, seeking to improve 
the situation and take control (Weiss and 
Hassan 2015). While this has benefits for 
the population, the ultimate aim is to sup-
port ISIL dominance in the region. ISIL has 
shown competence in providing security and 
governance in the areas it controls. Its lead-
ers have skilfully navigated Sunni culture in 
Iraq and increasingly in Syria, providing secu-
rity through a combination of repression, 
effective bureaucracy, and uncompromis-
ing law enforcement (Turkmani 2015). Yet 
ISIL’s  competence goes beyond its capacity 
to provide security: utilities, hospitals, food 
distribution and other services are reported 
to have improved rapidly in areas under its 
control. While JaN does not match ISIL’s 
ambitions to control all aspects of military 
and civil activity and JaN-administered areas 
in Syria do not have the ‘police state’ atmos-
phere of ISIL-controlled areas, JaN does 
aspire to control the courts and judiciary 
(Turkmani 2015).
When violent extremist groups oper-
ate locally, particularly in conflict situa-
tions, socio-economic discrimination and 
marginalisations appears to play a major 
role in recruitment. For instance, Islamist 
violent extremism in Kenya – including 
locally recruited Al Shabaab fighters, and 
Al Muhajiroun – is linked to the economic 
situation of Muslim’s in Kenya, particu-
larly in the Coast and North–East provinces 
that are majority Muslim. Socio-economic 
grievances, land-use rights, a lack of oppor-
tunities for youth, and ethnic or religious 
hostility towards a politically and economi-
cally dominant group in addition to repres-
sive and discriminatory state policies and 
actions rather than ideology, may be more 
influential with many Kenyan followers of Al 
Shabaab and affiliates (Berman and Lonsdale 
1992; Botha 2014, 2015; ICG 2012; Rift 
Valley Institute 2013; Botha 2014; Thompson 
2015). Similarly, the most deprived regions of 
Nigeria, such as Borno and Kano States, have 
become Boko Haram’s strongholds (Uzodike 
and Maiangwa 2012). Although the leader-
ship of Boko Haram has been drawn from 
Islamic clerics and students, professionals 
and students of tertiary institutions, many 
recruits join for money or a lack of other 
opportunities. In Iraq, Shia militias are effec-
tively in competition with the Iraqi army, and 
appear to be winning – militias offer better 
weapons and more generous pay, though 
they are also in competition with each other 
(Dodge 2012: 104; George 2014).
While the expanding reach of violence 
by militant Islamic organisations are often 
viewed through the prism of international 
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concerns about terrorism, the root causes are 
more often historical grievances, the state’s 
failure to address deeply-rooted marginali-
sation and insecurity, and its use of repres-
sive machinery to respond to insurgencies 
(Ganiel 2014; Lind and Dowd 2015).
What is significant is that Islamist extrem-
ism is not especially different from other reli-
giously motivated or structured extremism. 
Economic and governance crises are funda-
mental causes of violence and conflict in gen-
eral; Muslim-majority countries tend to be 
particularly vulnerable because their states 
are either often failing (or have failed), are 
corrupt and/or repressively governed, and 
are afflicted by falling living standards (Stern, 
2003). For example, beyond religious ideol-
ogy, there are other drivers of Al Shabaab and 
affiliates’ recruitment practices at individual, 
communal and structural levels that are 
consistent with those that have encouraged 
participation in the MRC, Mungiki and Mau 
Mau.
Social/Cultural Identity Pull Factors
The grievances outlined above are often 
framed in social or cultural terms and 
become a component of identity politics. For 
example, community grievances in Kenya 
are politicised due to the fractured nature 
of Kenyan politics along ethnic and reli-
gious lines, corruption and other systemic 
facilitators (Ndungu 2010; Oloo 2010; Kenya 
Transitional Justice Network 2013). These 
grievances and perceived victimisation can 
therefore be manipulated by leaders, which 
is what proponents of the terrorism school 
more strongly believe. Leaders of Islamist 
violent extremist groups can instrumen-
talise the perceived victimisation of fel-
low Muslims as a justification for extremist 
violence, although the use of a narrative of 
oppression to justify violence and recruit and 
motivate supporters is near-universal among 
violent extremist groups (Allan et al. 2015).
A component of this is ideology. When 
it comes to Islamist violent extremism spe-
cifically, how important ideology is has also 
become contested and politicised. Islamist 
violent extremists have been inspired by an 
ideology developed in the 1980s for a spe-
cific purpose – defending Muslims from 
oppression and occupation – and which, 
under the pressure of repeated participation 
in conflicts, its adherents have adapted and 
made more extreme. Some terrorism stud-
ies assume that ideology is a simple moti-
vating factor with some scholars going as 
far as asserting (controversially) that Islam, 
or at least Islamism, is inherently violent 
(e.g. Lewis 2002; Pipes 1989). Some politi-
cal science scholars (such as Neumann 2013; 
Wiktorowicz and Kaltenthaler 2006) offer 
ideology as a causal explanation for the 
onset of Islamist extremist violence and its 
persistence – how else can we explain why 
some groups resort to violence while others 
do not?
However, ideology does not explain eve-
rything and there is much work that casts 
doubt on the importance of ideology in 
both terrorism and conflict. Conflict stud-
ies is particularly revealing here, with Kaldor 
(2006: 73) notoriously arguing that conflicts 
‘may take the guise of traditional national-
ism, tribalism or religious fundamentalism’, 
but are actually the result of the disinte-
gration of states and structures under the 
pressures of globalisation. Though Kaldor’s 
‘new wars’ thesis has been criticised as mis-
representing ‘small wars’ as ‘new wars’, and 
assuming that her main case (the 1992–95 
Bosnian War) is representative, her conclu-
sions are nonetheless recognisable in some 
current conflicts, including in Iraq and Syria 
as she suggests that new wars are most 
likely to arise when centralised, authoritar-
ian states lose legitimacy or begin to col-
lapse. In this reading, religion is important 
not in terms of its contribution to ideology, 
but as a marker of social and political iden-
tity in the resulting struggles for resources 
or survival. Participants may frame conflicts 
in religious (and ethnic and national) terms 
but they are actually manifestations of some 
other historical force or process – which 
may not even be understood by participants 
themselves.
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At the meso-level, which primarily affects 
smaller communities and identity groups, 
social and cultural factors are the most prev-
alent, described by USAID (2011) as ‘pull’ fac-
tors that encourage involvement in violent 
extremism. Those with the strongest ‘pull’ 
are linked to identity, whether this is reli-
gious, ethnic or group identity. Individual 
and group identity has been found to be 
most strongly expressed in religious or ethnic 
terms. Much literature outlines how impor-
tant identity is for individuals to become 
involved in violent movements, particularly 
because radicalisation is a social process 
(Al Raffie 2013; Vidino 2011). Humans are 
capable of extraordinary feats, creative and 
destructive, if motivated by feelings of kin-
ship, real or imagined – ‘people don’t simply 
die and kill for a cause. They die and kill for 
each other’ (Atran 2011: ix).
Community also extends to the ‘imagined 
communities’ (Anderson 1982) of large iden-
tity groups such as nations or the umma (the 
global community of Muslims) that the vio-
lent group claims to represent. Several schol-
ars (e.g. Gleave 2014; Hegghammer 2010/11; 
Maher 2015) examine this ‘imagined com-
munity’ in the context of Islamist violent 
extremism, and agree that what emerged 
from the 1990s was an idea of transnational 
Muslim identity that at least on the surface 
displaced alternative notions of identity 
centred on specific ethnic, cultural or geo-
graphical factors. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
this transnational identity was mobilised 
for defensive purposes, but it was not long 
before Al Qaeda and other groups trans-
formed it into a doctrine of global terrorism 
and revolution. Psychological research has 
found that appeals to identity are essential 
for encouraging, legitimising and supporting 
involvement in violent extremist groups. ISIL 
gave new impetus to this apocalyptic strain 
within jihadism, naming its English lan-
guage magazine Dabiq, after the site of one 
of the most important battles in the proph-
ecies. This ‘cosmic ideology’ has enhanced 
ISIL’s ability to recruit in Syria and Iraq, 
in the wider MENA region and in Western 
Europe through a sophisticated propaganda 
machine. In Kenya, a small number of radical 
Kenyan clerics propagating such messages 
have been the primary recruiting channel 
since the mid-2000s for mobilising Kenyans 
to travel and fight in Somalia. What remains 
unclear, however, is whether followers are 
attracted more by this ideological rhetoric or 
are attracted on identity grounds to the duty 
to defend fellow Muslims (ICG 2012; Botha 
2014; Botha 2015).
Religious identity is too vague to meaning-
fully separate from other equally significant 
identity markers such as ethno/nationalist 
identity (Juergensmeyer 2003). Both religious 
ideologues and politically-motivated ethnic 
elites are able to capitalise on and engen-
der shared identity by promoting transna-
tional networks to support insurgents in the 
homeland (Kaldor 2007; Yadav 2010). It is 
also important to note that while the focus 
is currently on Salafi-jihadists, Shias in Syria 
and Iraq employ a similar narrative to recruit 
people relying on religious but also on sectar-
ian divides between the Sunni and Shia com-
munities. The Shia militia movement received 
a major boost with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani’s June 2014 fatwa encouraging Shia to 
fight a ‘righteous jihad’ against ISIL (Stansfield 
2015). Following this, many Shia militias 
formed into the Hashd Shaabi – people’s 
militias – to combat ISIL, revealing the extent 
to which sectarian politics have become 
entrenched in the conflict. ‘Not only does 
Daesh [ISIL] fight as Sunnis rather than Iraqis, 
but the Hashd is equally sectarian, fighting 
ISIL as Shi’as rather than Iraqis’ (Stansfield 
2015). In conflict, the tactics of the Shia mili-
tias supports ISIL’s narrative that the Iraqi 
government represents an existential threat 
to Sunnis. The militias themselves have been 
extensively accused of abuses and atrocities, 
most recently against Sunnis believed to have 
collaborated with ISIL (Human Rights Watch 
2015). In parallel, their success in placing 
officials in positions of responsibility (George 
2014; Dodge 2012: 63) supports ISIL’s argu-
ment that the government and its security 
forces are not Iraqi but Shia.
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Organisational structure and 
demographics
Aggregating diverse movements, groups 
and activities under the single heading 
of  terrorism is, according to Neumann 
(2013), the ‘cardinal sin’ of terrorism stud-
ies. However, even contributions such as 
Neumann’s own, which recognise the diver-
sity of what we categorise as terrorism or 
violent extremism, are apt to conflate its 
Islamist manifestations into a single phenom-
enon. For instance, Berman (2009) conflates 
Hamas, Hizbollah and Al Qaida as Islamist 
terrorism without acknowledging that one is 
Shia and the others are Sunni; two function 
as active political parties and one as popular 
social movements; one is backed by Iran, the 
other two by Syria; one is a nationalist group 
focused solely on Israel/Palestine while the 
others have global ambitions and reach. With 
the religious inspiration discussed above, this 
section considers the importance of organi-
sational structure and demographics.
There is little research that specifically 
addresses the question of the range and 
diversity of Islamist violent extremist groups. 
However, there are studies of specific groups, 
such as Hansen (2013) on Al Shabaab and 
Comolli (2015) on Boko Haram, and many on 
Al Qaida (Wright 2006 and Burke 2007 are 
journalistic accounts but among the most 
solid). These provide fine-grained accounts 
of how each group developed in its own spe-
cific historical and socio-political milieu, and 
taken together provide a corrective to sim-
plistic, totalising explanations which present 
Islamist violent extremism as monolithic or 
homogenous. Scholars focusing on specific 
groups make particular reference to the risks 
of aggregation. Holbrook (2014) is cautious 
of over-simplification of the wide range and 
developing nature of ideological and theo-
retical perspectives amongst  ‘jihadist’ move-
ments (29–39). He suggests that the reductive 
term ‘single  narrative’  simplistically  combines 
a diverse and dynamic set of  phenomena into 
a single analytical construct. This can also 
lead to errors in  counter-terrorism by fail-
ing to appreciate that radical Islamism is a 
highly contested arena, and overlooking the 
decision to renounce violence on the part 
of influential ideologues in Egypt, Western 
 governments missed opportunities to del-
egitimise Al Qaida in the eyes of its global 
support base (Gerges 2005).
The Syrian civil war and the rise of ISIL 
have refocused attention on foreign fight-
ers, which is perceived to be a largely recent 
phenomenon and associated especially with 
Islamist violent extremism (Hegghammer 
2010). This can be attributed to both the 
emergence of an ideology of transnational 
participation in Islamist thinking in Saudi 
Arabia in the 1980s, and the growing number 
of conflicts in failed, post-colonial states with 
Muslim majorities or significant minorities. 
The effect of Islamist foreign fighters on the 
post-2003 insurgency in Iraq is of particular 
note. The leader of what became Al Qaida in 
Iraq (AQI), which ultimately mutated into 
ISIL, was Ahmad Fadeel al-Nazal al-Khalay-
leh, better known as al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian 
who had operated his own militant training 
camp in Afghanistan before 9/11. After the 
2003 invasion al-Zarqawi found refuge in 
Iraq and, with his group of mostly non-Iraqi 
militants, sought to change the environment 
to suit them and recruited additional foreign 
fighters (Hafez 2014: 443). Al-Zarqawi’s strat-
egy was to attack Shia populations and mon-
uments to promote sectarian warfare, and to 
use suicide bombing strategically, not just 
tactically, in order to move the conflict from 
classic insurgency to ‘global jihad’. Instead 
of the usual pattern of fighters being forced 
out of the territories they had fought for (as 
in Afghanistan or Bosnia), a sectarian jihad 
would create the conditions of security for 
the mujahideen (Al-Zarqawi’s ultimate objec-
tive) and insecurity for everyone else.
However, while the scale of the phenom-
enon may be unprecedented, it is not in itself 
new. Malet (2013) shows that foreign fight-
ers have existed since at least the mid-nine-
teenth century, if not longer, and they are 
by no means confined to Islamists. Indeed, 
while foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq may 
now have passed the 20,000 believed to have 
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joined the conflict in Afghanistan during 
the 1980s (Neumann 2015), approximately 
32,000 foreigners fought in the Spanish 
Civil War (1936–39). This however is neither 
new nor unique to Muslim diaspora com-
munities. For example, the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka was sus-
tained by financial support from Tamil dias-
pora channelled through the radical World 
Tamil Movement (Bell 2009).
Meanwhile, not all Islamist violent extrem-
ist groups attract foreign fighters. While 
over a thousand are believed to have fought 
with Al Shabaab in Somalia since the mid-
2000s (in declining numbers since 2012), 
mainly from the Somali diaspora, far fewer 
are thought to have fought within Kenya 
(Ford 2010; Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher, 
and Sheehan 2012; Pantucci 2012; Hansen 
2014). Most significantly, in its embrace of 
decentralised guerrilla warfare and cellular 
terrorism in Kenya (unlike its more bureau-
cratic military operations in Somalia), Al 
Shabaab have come to more closely resem-
ble Mau Mau and Mungiki’s loose structures 
and roving independent bands. This reflects 
the different security and conflict dynamics 
present in Somalia relative to those in opera-
tion in Kenya – and the adaptation required 
of Al Shabaab to these diverse conditions 
(Kanogo 1987; Berman and Lonsdale 1992; 
Rasmussen 2010; Marchal 2011; Hansen 
2013; Nzes 2014; Lia 2015). Despite its ori-
gin as an offshoot of ISIL, JaN’s majority 
Syrian makeup ‘contributes to a crucial level 
of social grounding’, while its ‘strict and 
highly selective foreign fighter recruitment 
policies have ensured an ongoing supply of 
high-caliber muhajireen [emigrants]’ (Lister 
2015: 18).
Tactics and Methods
There are assertions that ideological terror-
ists do not seem to be constrained by rational 
strategic limitations in comparison with 
nationalists, and search for the most destruc-
tive weapons available to cause high amount 
of atrocities (Fettweis 2009). The lethality of 
religiously inspired terrorism and Islamist 
extremism in particular has attracted signifi-
cant attention. Terrorism studies highlighted 
that one of the novelties of ‘new terrorism’ 
includes its aim to commit mass-casualty 
attacks and contained much debate after 
9/11 over whether Islamist extremists were 
prepared or preparing to carry out mass-
casualty attacks using chemical/radiologi-
cal/biological weapons. Evidence recovered 
from Al Qaida laboratories in Afghanistan 
suggested that they were actively research-
ing unconventional weapons, and there 
have been periodic cases (including in the 
UK) of Al Qaida-affiliated groups planning 
to use chemical or radiological substances. 
There are assertions that this marks Islamist 
extremists out from other groups, although 
proponents of ‘new terrorism’ theories such 
as Hoffman (2006) also acknowledge the use 
of chemical weapons by groups such as Aum 
Shirinkyo in Japan.
From this perspective religious extremist 
groups have different value systems, mecha-
nisms of legitimisation and justification, con-
cepts of morality, and world-views, and are 
‘consequently unconstrained by the political, 
moral or practical constraints that may affect 
other terrorists’ – this includes the need for 
popular support (Hoffman 2006: 88). The 
phenomenon of suicide attacks has attracted 
particular attention from academics, espe-
cially post-9/11, and the sharp statistical 
rise as a result of attacks in post-2003 Iraq. 
Berman (2009) argues that suicide bomb-
ing is often a marker of religious violence 
not because of theology but the complexity 
of the target: religiously inspired terrorists 
may be the only ones with the commitment 
required to survive in countries such as 
Israel where targets have been significantly 
hardened. As a result, he concludes that the 
‘threat from modern religious terrorist organ-
isations is unprecedented’ and that Islamist 
groups are far more lethal than secular ones 
(Berman 2009: 8). For example, in Nigeria, in 
comparison to Boko Haram, MEND’s choice 
of targets has been more clearly instrumen-
tal: despite occasional bomb attacks in major 
cities, MEND primarily restricted its attacks 
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to the oil industry and the government’s 
 supporting infrastructure in the Delta. It 
has generally avoided targeting civilians 
(although has mounted occasional attacks on 
hotels, cargo ships, and fishing vessels). It has 
not embraced the tactic of suicide bombing.
This analysis has significant flaws not least 
the fact that it overlooks the adoption of sui-
cide bombing by Marxist-Leninist groups, 
notably the LTTE in Sri Lanka (which per-
petrated more suicide bombings than any 
other group prior to 2003) but also the PKK 
in Turkey. In fact, others argue that terrorism 
is actually becoming less lethal, as the num-
ber of fatalities per 100,000 people from the 
1970s to 2005 broadly decreased (Pinker 
2011), though this misses the upsurge in 
fatalities in Iraq in 2006–07 and the later 
upsurges in Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, 
and Nigeria (RAND n.d.). Tucker’s (2001) 
‘lethality index’ for international terrorism 
demonstrates that lethality has rested at a 
higher plateau since the late 1970s rather 
than surged ahead, adding that the ‘claim 
that there is a tendency toward mass-casu-
alty attacks rests, then, on a very few cases 
compared to the total number of interna-
tional terrorist attacks.’ Taking this longer 
view shows that the vast majority of terror-
ist attacks worldwide still kill few people 
(being mostly directed against property), 
and that by 2007 the most lethal terrorist 
groups were the Maoist Shining Path (Peru) 
and the Marxist-Leninist LTTE (Sri Lanka). In 
fact, the history of Islamist militancy since 
9/11 demonstrates a relative lack of novel 
techniques including in comparison to other 
violent groups. With the exception of the 
planning and scale of financing required 
for Al Shabaab’s 2013 Westgate mall attack, 
most attacks by Al Shabaab and affiliates in 
Kenya have been similar to those conducted 
by non-Islamist actors in their use of small 
arms, grenades and small IEDs.
With that being said, there does appear to 
be a difference in the scope and style of Salafi-
jihadist violence inspired by Al Qaida. In 
Nigeria in 2011, Boko Haram mounted its first 
suicide-bomb attacks targeting the National 
Police Headquarters and UN Headquarters in 
Abuja, presumably in emulation of Al Qaida, 
with which Boko Haram was then in alliance. 
The shift has also been evident in the targets 
of attacks: Muslim communities were origi-
nally forewarned if attacks were planned in 
their areas, but after Yusuf’s death attacks 
became more indiscriminate. In 2011 and 
2012, around twenty suicide attacks were 
launched against religious (both Christian 
and Muslim), military and other government 
targets (Roggio 2012). Its change in strategy 
reflected a more militant ideology, reflected 
by its declarations of allegiance first to Al 
Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and 
then to ISIL. In Iraq and Syria particularly, Al 
Qaida-linked groups have succeeded in their 
aim of radicalising these conflicts. They have 
made these conflicts more lethal by import-
ing suicide attacks as a deliberate strategy. 
They have made them more intractable, by 
provoking sectarian violence on an appall-
ing scale. ISIL’s inducement of fear is useful 
not just in a political context (i.e. as terror-
ism) but also as a military strategy. It is noto-
rious for its gross human rights abuses and 
performative violence, while broadcasting 
media of its brutal executions has helped it 
project military power and undertake auda-
cious operations.
By examining three case studies of IVE, it 
becomes clear that there are important differ-
ences between IVE groups and other conflict 
actors linked to ideology. However, these dif-
ferences do not always transpire the way we 
would expect. Ideology is important for the 
leaders of IVE groups especially – some are 
ideological entrepreneurs who seek to mobi-
lise followers behind a cause. Ideology can 
be a factor for followers, but people in con-
flict situations join violent groups for a wide 
range of reasons – social, psychological and 
practical, as well as political. In many cases 
therefore, ideology can have a fragmenting 
effect, as the drivers differ between leaders 
and followers. Although Salafi-jihadists are 
in many ways different – and more threaten-
ing – than other violent groups, they express 
their worldview through a narrative that is 
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strikingly similar to that proposed by many 
other militant movements (religious and 
secular).
Implications for Development Actors
The similarities and differences for devel-
opment responses expands the debate that 
began in the 1990s on how development and 
conflict interact. Goodhand created a frame-
work to map the contribution that develop-
ment practitioners could make to conflict 
resolution and post-conflict reconstruc-
tion. The earliest approach was conceptual-
ised ‘working around war’, as development 
practitioners sought to continue their 
activities while avoiding direct involvement 
(Goodhand 2001a). ‘Working around war’ 
assumed conflict to be an ‘impediment or 
negative externality that is to be avoided’ 
(Goodhand 2001a: 61). From this per-
spective, development was understood to 
automatically contribute to peace, so that 
nothing additional would be required (Uvin 
2002).
A later approach was ‘working in war’, 
with development agencies acknowledging 
a potential relationship between develop-
ment and conflict and seeking to minimise 
their impact, but without addressing the 
conflict directly: ‘Agencies working in areas 
of active violence have attempted to miti-
gate war-related risks and also to minimise 
the potential for programmes to fuel or pro-
long violence’ (Goodhand 2006a: 264). The 
most recent and most proactive approach is 
‘working on war’, where development prac-
titioners are directly engaged in peacebuild-
ing activities (Goodhand 2006b). Conflict 
prevention and resolution becomes the pri-
mary goal of development, which means that 
‘policies and programmes must be justified 
in these terms’, including direct peacebuild-
ing and statebuilding initiatives (Goodhand 
2001b: 31).
The response of development actors to vio-
lent extremism thus far has fallen within the 
‘working in’ category, tackling the drivers of 
radicalisation and recruitment. CVE program-
ming for instance is based on the assumption 
that ‘addressing both the manifestations of 
violent extremism and the conditions condu-
cive to violent extremism is a developmental 
challenge. It will require strengthening the 
fundamental building blocks of equitable 
development, human rights, governance 
and the rule of law’ (European Union 2015: 
3). The result has been a burgeoning indus-
try of CVE programming (Zeiger and Aly 
2015). While there is no adequate measure 
for the effectiveness of these programmes 
(Chowdhury-Fink 2015), they aim to prevent 
involvement in violent extremist groups. 
This is seen to be particularly important 
in countries such as Kenya, where violent 
extremism has not yet escalated into all-out 
war. In this context, CVE programming can 
limit escalation by undermining support for 
violent extremist groups. However, it aims 
to reduce vulnerability to radicalisation and 
recruitment among those who are not yet 
involved; CVE therefore tends not to address 
communities viewed as being ‘at risk’, rather 
than the violent groups themselves.
Existing tools to engage with conflict can 
also be applied to IVE groups. Particularly 
in countries or regions where governments 
have tended to rely on strong, securitised 
responses, such as Nigeria and Kenya, secu-
rity sector reform (SSR) can promote a less 
violent response, and hence reduce the risk 
of violence increasing or recurring. As the 
Nigeria case demonstrates, if a government’s 
default response is to crush dissent or target 
whole communities in unrefined sweeps, 
there is potential to spark spin-off move-
ments that may be more violent, unpredict-
able and strategic than their predecessors. 
Violent responses by the government can 
also increase support for violent extremist 
groups.
While this is unlikely to extend to reform 
of the armed forces, at least in the response 
of development agencies, O’Neill and 
Cockayne (2015) advocate programmes that 
draw on demobilisation, disarmament and 
reintegration (DDR) principles to disengage 
violent extremists and reintegrate them into 
mainstream society. Similarly, Jones, Lynch, 
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Marchand and Denov, and Koehler (in Zeiger 
and Aly 2015) examine the potential of dis-
engaging, deradicalising and reintegrating 
fighters involved in violent extremism. These 
approaches adapt interventions designed 
to deal with other forms of violence, and 
engage with the institutions and individu-
als affected by violent conflict. Developed 
in response to the decades of civil war in the 
1990s and 2000s, they have been applied to 
a range of conflicts, including ethnic divi-
sions. Because they do not engage directly 
with violent extremist groups, they do not 
need to specifically focus or respond to the 
impact of ideology, or the other factors that 
may make Islamist violent extremists differ-
ent from other violent extremist groups.
Directly ‘working on’ violent extremism 
is much more difficult, particularly within a 
peacebuilding and statebuilding framework. 
A key aim of statebuilding is the promotion 
of inclusive political settlements, where com-
peting elites are brought into decision-making 
on governance and economics. However, with 
some Islamist violent groups, a negotiated 
political settlement is not an aspiration. For 
instance, Al Shabaab’s aims in Kenya are to 
further destabilise state authority in Somalia’s 
southern hinterland and move these areas 
into the orbit of an Islamist territory based to 
some extent on a historical ‘Greater Somalia’ 
project, Somali irredentism, and local pan-
Muslim sentiment. Efforts to achieve a Greater 
Somalia have been a source of conflict with 
Somalia since Kenya’s independence. With the 
more recent overlay of Islamist extremist rhet-
oric and practice and Al Shabaab’s base being 
outside Kenya, achieving a political settlement 
with these goals at play appears highly unlikely. 
In the long term, political settlements linked 
to Kenya’s recent constitutional devolution of 
power to the counties may redress some griev-
ances regarding autonomy and central state 
overreach if implemented in a manner that 
empowers local communities, thereby draw-
ing some of the venom not only from Islamist 
violent groups but also others, such as the 
Mombasa Republican Council (MRC).
The political settlement aspect of 
 statebuilding is therefore exceptionally chal-
lenging in this context and any intervention 
is unlikely to reconcile global Salafi-jihadist 
groups and their franchises. A complicating 
factor is the diversity among violent Islamist 
groups in conflict situations and their ten-
dency to fragment. In the Boko Haram case 
there have been disagreements over core 
beliefs, strategy, and tactics, which have 
resulted in splinter groups such as Ansaru. 
Al Shabaab in Somalia has also been host to 
major internal disagreements regarding sim-
ilar issues since 2011. However, the lack of 
cohesion within IVE groups may also provide 
an opportunity for negotiation. For example, 
Gerges (2003) recommended that attempts 
should be made to negotiate with jihadists 
who do not subscribe to the Al Qaida doc-
trine. This strategy can reduce the power 
of the most problematic Islamist groups by 
undermining their legitimacy and fragment-
ing the extremists’ support base.
The fact that Salafi-jihadists are irreconcil-
able does not mean that promoting inclusive 
settlements to conflicts where they are active 
is fruitless. In fact, our analysis suggests 
that such efforts should be prioritised. First, 
these uncompromising groups partly derive 
their legitimacy from socio-political griev-
ances, as in Iraq where the post-2003 set-
tlement has failed to include meaningfully 
the Sunni Arab minority, and in Syria where 
a minoritarian government has lost the sup-
port of large parts of the Sunni Arab majority. 
Addressing some of the manifold problems 
of governance in both countries would not 
bring ISIL and JaN to the negotiating table 
but would diminish their support among the 
disenfranchised Sunni Arabs. Second, as we 
have shown, Islamist violent extremism is far 
from being a monolithic and stable move-
ment, and within the broad scope of the term 
are groups that are potentially interested in 
political settlements. Attention should there-
fore be paid to breakaway groups, which may 
perceive they have more to gain from settle-
ment rather than conflict, especially in the 
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case of protracted civil conflicts in a situation 
of stalemate.
Another avenue for development actors 
to support statebuilding is in the develop-
ment of core state functions. This approach 
assumes that increasing the capacity of the 
state to provide core functions such as secu-
rity, rule of law and macroeconomic policies 
will increase trust, facilitate the provision of 
public services – including, crucially, law and 
order – and strengthen state legitimacy. This 
approach may have an impact on some mem-
bers of violent Islamist groups that are driven 
to join because of grievances. Addressing his-
torical grievances, and a state’s failings to 
address deeply-rooted marginalisation and 
insecurity in these places, could reduce the 
ability of violent Islamist groups to mobilise 
and retain support. More pertinently, weak 
states have been shown to be more vulner-
able to civil war and insurgency (Tilly 2003) 
and also struggle to contain violent extremist 
threats. The collapse of state capacity in Iraq 
as a result of the 2003 invasion and occu-
pation is a particularly stark example: the 
sudden transformation from police state to 
state of anarchy created the space for a wide 
range of violent extremist groups to flour-
ish, from Shia militants to Al Qaida. Building 
or rebuilding state capacity is, we have con-
cluded, an essential pre-requisite for man-
aging Islamist violent extremist problems. 
Emphasis should be put on restoring govern-
ance in opposition-controlled areas, espe-
cially those that are threatened by further 
Islamist extremist expansion.
A related strategy is the provision of 
public goods and services expected by the 
population to strengthen state legitimacy 
and reduce violent opposition. While those 
engaged in violent extremism due to griev-
ances are likely to be somewhat appeased, it 
will have limited affect on the upper levels of 
Islamist violent groups. However, improved 
provision of public goods and services could 
have a considerable impact on the ability of 
leaders to recruit from or gain the passive 
acceptance of the wider population. Part of 
ISIL’s success is a combination of its presence 
in areas with weak governance, an active war 
economy and endemic violence. By bringing 
some form of order and control, even if vio-
lent, ISIL presents itself as the only legitimate 
authority, with a monopoly on the use of 
force. Turkmani (2015) also highlights how 
this reputation for governance, based on the 
provision of security and basic services, has 
played a key role in recruiting supporters and 
ensuring assent.
If the state is incapable or unwilling to 
make good these shortfalls, then there may 
be scope for others to step in. For example, 
Turkmani recommends that international 
organisations promote economic measures, 
such as job-creation schemes and fuel 
distribution in areas of Syria that can 
be reached. Interventions to promote 
economic security in conflict-afflicted areas 
have the potential to reduce or at least 
contain support for the most problematic 
violent Islamists.
The overarching aim of peacebuilding is 
to address the causes and consequences of 
conflict. Achieving this requires a focus on 
the grievances, fault-lines and opportunity-
seeking that underlie the conflict. Zaum, 
Gippert and Heaven (2015) consider religion 
and religious extremism to be expressions 
of social, economic or political grievances 
and opportunity-seeking. This aligns with 
Kunovich and Hodson’s (1999) findings in 
Croatia that religion is merely a social marker 
for economic, demographic and political 
forces. However, other studies dispute these 
findings and suggest instead that religion 
has the capacity to both stimulate and mobi-
lise collective action and that restrictions on 
religion itself can make significant contri-
butions to explaining religiously motivated 
violence. In this analysis, religion itself can 
be the source of grievance (Finke and Harris 
2012, Finke and Martin 2012, Dowd 2014).
However, focusing on religion as a source of 
grievance leading to conflict and extremism 
could mean missing the underlying causes 
and drivers of the conflict. Since there is no 
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simple link between religious ideas and violent 
action – our analysis suggests that extremist 
violence results from a complex combination 
of situational factors, social enablers, political 
triggers, and  individual characteristics – the 
problem is seeking to understand how a situa-
tion of stable coexistence breaks down to the 
extent that religion (or rather religious differ-
ence) can becomes a threat to security, which 
requires an examination of the root causes 
and an effort to address some of the most per-
tinent. In Iraq, for example, the exclusion of 
Sunni Arabs from the post-2003 political set-
tlement generated grievances, which although 
religiously expressed, are political at source.
While all of the groups examined here 
show a range of drivers and motivations, each 
group has been influenced by grievances to 
some extent, particularly at the lower levels. 
Addressing grievances will not necessarily 
resolve the conflict. If a group sees the state 
as the problem or has global and utopian 
aspirations, leaders and the most commit-
ted followers are unlikely to abandon their 
extremist programmes. However, addressing 
grievances may contain groups and, in time, 
reduce their support.
This analysis of how development actors 
can engage with IVE points to a hierarchy 
of interventions (see Figure 1). The bottom 
layer indicates that the most significant con-
tribution development can make is preventa-
tive, seeking to limit involvement in violent 
extremism by promoting good governance, 
human rights, development and rule of law. 
This overlaps with the second layer, which 
seeks to address both the grievances that 
have driven people into violent extremism, 
as well as the impact of violent extremism, 
from the violence it causes to heavy-handed 
government responses. The top of the hierar-
chy is the most difficult and relies on careful 
timing. As discussed above, negotiating with 
strategic groups, diminishing support for uto-
pian groups and catching breakaway groups 
has the greatest potential for transformation.
As this hierarchy brings together a range of 
strategies that are currently applied towards 
conflict actors, it suggests that there is no dif-
ference in how development actors should 
respond to IVE groups. While there are many 
similarities, the differences between IVE 
groups and other conflict actors requires a 
contextualised approach that engages with 
the specific ways that groups operate, con-
sidering their aims and objectives, tactics and 
use of violence and recruitment and motiva-
tion strategies.
•Negoang with 'strategic' groups 
•Diminishing support for 'utopian' groups 
•Catching breakaway groups 
Transformave 
•Reintegraon of fighters 
•Prevenng heavy-handed government 
response 
•Addressing social and polical grievances 
•Violence reducon 
Ameliorave
•CVE programmes 
•Promong good governance Preventave 
Figure 1: Hierarchy of Interventions.
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Note
 1 Although the term ‘drivers’ is commonly 
used, factors’ is more appropriate, as a 
range of situational, social/cultural and 
individual factors need to align.
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